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THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON’S BROAD 
INTERPRETATION OF THE “REASON TO KNOW” 
STANDARD IN IN RE DEPENDENCY OF Z.J.G. AND WHY A 
UNIFORM, BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE STANDARD 
WILL LEAD TO BETTER OUTCOMES 
Dylan Hartsook* 
Introduction 
Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) to 
remedy the widespread and disparate removal of Indian Children from their 
unique cultures.1 Around the time ICWA was enacted, a survey of sixteen 
states showed “approximately 85 percent of all Indian children in foster 
care were living in non-Indian homes.”2 ICWA provides standards for 
removing Indian children from their families in an effort to further the 
objectives of keeping Indian children in their cultures and preventing the 
breaking-up of families.3 One of these standards, and the focal point of this 
Note, requires state courts to provide formal notice to the child’s tribe 
where the court has “reason to know” the child is an Indian child in a 
custody proceeding.4 The “reason to know” provision plays a key role as a 
gatekeeping function to afford tribes the opportunity to protect their 
children.
5
 If a court decides there is not “reason to know” the child is, in 
fact, an Indian child, the child may be deprived of the heightened standards 
of ICWA.6 Thus, whether courts apply this standard broadly or take a more 
narrow view plays a major role in custody proceedings. A uniform, broad 
application of ICWA’s “reason to know” standard better serves legislative 
intent, delivers more equitable and expedient outcomes for Native 
American children, and respects tribes’ rights to exclusively determine 
tribal membership.  
In 2020, the Washington Supreme Court adopted a broad interpretation 
of “reason to know” under ICWA in the case of In re Dependency of Z.J.G. 
This Note analyzes the Z.J.G. decision and evaluates how such an 
                                                                                                                 
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 8 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7530. 
 2. Id. at 9, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7531. 
 3. Id. at 8, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7530. 
 4. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).  
 5. In re Dependency of Z.J.G., 471 P.3d 853, 856 (Wash. 2020). 
 6. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). 
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interpretation will lead to better outcomes. In addition, this Note explains 
how a broad interpretation leads to more desirable outcomes while honoring 
tribes’ exclusive role in determining tribal membership.7 Part I of this Note 
lays out a history of court decisions inconsistently applying ICWA’s 
“reason to know” standard. Often, these courts take it upon themselves to 
determine whether a child is an Indian child.8 In Part II, this Note explores 
the Supreme Court of Washington’s decision, in In re Dependency of 
Z.J.G., to adopt a broad interpretation of “reason to know” and honor tribes’ 
exclusive role in determining tribal membership.9 Part III addresses the 
need for a uniform and broad interpretation of the “reason to know” 
standard and the benefits it will carry. This Note addresses how to best 
implement a policy of broadly interpreting the “reason to know” standard in 
Part IV. Lastly, Part V concludes this Note and summarizes the need for a 
uniform, broad application of “reason to know.” 
I. History of States’ Application of “Reason to Know” Under ICWA 
After the enactment of ICWA in 1978, state courts largely took it upon 
themselves to define tribal membership and carve out exceptions to the 
application of ICWA.10 One example of such an exception is the “existing 
Indian family” exception, which is no longer a viable doctrine according to 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).
11
 The “existing Indian family” 
exception allowed courts to ignore ICWA if it believed the child was not a 
member of an “existing Indian family.”12 Yet, even with the repudiation of 
the “existing Indian family” exception, state courts’ application of ICWA 
remains unpredictable and inconsistent through varying interpretations of 
the “reason to know” standard.13 
A. States’ Use of the “Existing Indian Family” Exception 
Until it was declared inviable, state courts applied an exception known as 
the “existing Indian family” exception when deciding whether ICWA 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Z.J.G., 471 P.3d at 870. 
 8. See infra Part I. 
 9. See Z.J.G., 471 P.3d at 870. 
 10. Id. at 862. 
 11. Id. at 863 (quoting ICWA Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 38778-01, 38815 (June 14, 
2016) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 23)). 
 12. Id. at 862. 
 13. Kate Fort, Reason to Know [ICWA] Out of the Ohio Court of Appeals, TURTLE 
TALK (Jan. 25, 2019), https://turtletalk.blog/2019/01/25/reason-to-know-icwa-out-of-the-
ohio-court-of-appeals/. 
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applied to a custody proceeding.14 In applying this exception, courts would 
“examine the child and their family and unilaterally determine the ‘Indian-
ness’” of the family.15 Even if a court had knowledge of a child’s status as a 
member of a Native American Tribe, it would not afford the child ICWA 
protection if he or she was not a member of an “existing Indian family.”16 
Thus, under the “existing Indian family” exception, a child might meet the 
statutory definition of an Indian child under ICWA yet not be afforded the 
protections provided by ICWA.17 
The origins of the “existing Indian family” exception can be traced back 
to the Supreme Court of Kansas in In re Adoption of Baby Boy L.18 In this 
case, a child whose father had Native American ancestry was born out of 
wedlock.19 On the date of the child’s birth, the mother placed the child for 
adoption and signed a consent form directed to the child’s adoptive 
parents.20 The fact that the child may have Native ancestry, possibly 
invoking ICWA, became apparent after the father objected to the adoption 
and asked the trial court to grant full custody rights.21 The father then filed 
an amended petition asking the court to place the child within his tribe 
pursuant to ICWA, which the trial court inevitably denied.22 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kansas relied on legislative history—
more specifically, congressional intent—when making its decision.23 The 
court concluded that Congress enacted ICWA to maintain “family and tribal 
relationships existing in Indian homes and to set minimum standards for the 
removal of Indian children from their existing Indian environment.”24 The 
court, therefore, did not find it appropriate to remove from adoptive custody 
an “illegitimate infant” who never lived in an Indian home and probably 
never would; holding otherwise, reasoned the court, would violate 
legislative intent.25 
Several states then began to adopt the “existing Indian family” exception. 
For example, the Supreme Court of Washington endorsed the exception in 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Z.J.G., 471 P.3d at 863 (quoting ICWA Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. at 38815). 
 15. Id. at 862.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.  
 18. 643 P.2d 168, 171 (Kan. 1982). 
 19. Id. at 172. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 173.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 175. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.  
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its 1992 decision of In re Adoption of Crews.26 In Crews, a pregnant woman 
decided to put her baby up for adoption.27 Crews—the mother—testified 
that, when arranging the adoption, she told her counselor she had Native 
American ancestry but “didn't know how much.”28 Before the adoption, 
Crews signed a form relinquishing all of her rights to notice of all 
proceedings, verifying that ICWA did not apply to the adoption.29 In mid-
1989, the court approved relinquishment of Crews’ parental rights of the 
child.30 Once the adopting family took the child home, Crews contacted her 
counselor and requested the return of her child.31 Following extensive 
contact with the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, Crews received a 
Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood (CDIB) a few months later and 
sought to vacate the order terminating her parental rights on the grounds 
that her consent was obtained in violation of ICWA.32 
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the decision of the lower 
court, ruling that the child did not become an Indian child until Crews 
received the CDIB, at which point Crews already waived her parental 
rights.33 To bolster its conclusion, the court endorsed the “existing Indian 
Family” exception utilized by other states, by relying on the fact that Crews 
“testified that her family [did] not regularly participate in any Indian 
practices or events.”34 The court further considered the fact that Crews had 
never been to Oklahoma, that she had no plans to relocate to Oklahoma, 
that there was insufficient evidence supporting the idea that the child would 
grow up in an “Indian environment,” and Crews’ lack of interest in her 
Native American heritage.35 While acknowledging “ICWA was enacted to 
counteract the large scale separations of Indian children from their families, 
tribes, and culture,” the court did not believe applying ICWA to the facts in 
Crews served the statute’s purpose.36 Thus, the court concluded that “[t]o 
                                                                                                                 
 26. In re Adoption of Crews, 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992), overruled in part by In re 
Adoption of T.A.W., 383 P.3d 492 (Wash. 2016).  
 27. Id. at 306. 
 28. Id. at 307. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 307–08. 
 33. Id. at 308. 
 34. Id. at 308–10. 
 35. Id. at 310. 
 36. Id. at 308.  
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apply ICWA in this specific situation would not further the policies and 
purposes of [the Act].”37  
In a concurring opinion, Justice Andersen thought the court ought not 
look into the “Indian-ness” of the birth family.38 Instead, Justice Andersen 
believed that, because the child did not meet the statutory definition of 
“Indian child” at the time Crews relinquished her parental rights, ICWA did 
not apply.39 Justice Andersen’s view that courts need not look into the 
“Indian-ness” of a family turned out to eventually be the prevailing view.40 
Washington was among numerous states that adopted the eventually 
overruled “existing Indian family” exception. The Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma endorsed the exception in In re Adoption of Baby Boy D.41 In 
Baby Boy D., the court held ICWA did not apply to a child “who has never 
resided in an Indian family, and who has a non-Indian mother.”42 Similarly, 
in South Dakota, the state’s supreme court held that, although ICWA does 
not expressly carve out an “existing Indian family” exception, it is “implied 
throughout the Act.”43 There, the court held that, because the child only 
lived with their non-Indian mother, the child did not live in an “Indian 
home” and ICWA did not apply to the adoption proceedings.44  
The State of Indiana also endorsed the exception in In re Adoption of 
T.R.M.45 In T.R.M., the Supreme Court of Indiana found it inappropriate to 
apply ICWA where the child was not separated from her “Indian family.”46 
The court reasoned that, despite the T.R.M. child’s biological Native 
American ancestry, she was adopted five days after being born and spent 
the subsequent seven years with the family whom adopted her.47  
The Supreme Court of Washington, in Z.J.G., addressed the “existing 
Indian Family” exception as an example of how states have a long history 
of diminishing the heightened protections afforded to Native American 
children by ICWA.48 The court stated that the exception constituted a line 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. at 310. 
 38. Id. at 312 (Andersen, J., concurring). 
 39. Id. at 313. 
 40. ICWA Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 38778-01, 38801–02 (June 14, 2016) (to be 
codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 23). 
 41. 742 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Okla. 1985).  
 42. Id. 
 43. Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650, 653 (S.D. 1987).  
 44. Id.  
 45. 525 N.E.2d 298, 303 (Ind. 1988).  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
 48. In re Dependency of Z.J.G., 471 P.3d 853, 862–63 (Wash. 2020). 
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of thinking that ICWA sought to prevent.49 Moreover, it drew on the 
eventual abrogation of the “existing Indian family” exception as an 
illustration of the trend towards a progressive application of ICWA.50 
B. The Abrogation of the “Existing Indian Family” Exception 
By 2016, many states had overturned the “existing Indian family” 
exception—including Kansas, the exception’s state of origin.51 In fact, 
“[o]nly a handful of courts continue[d] to recognize the exception” by 
2016.52 However, the BIA later clarified in an agency regulation that there 
is not an “existing Indian family” exception under ICWA.53 In this 
regulation, the BIA noted that states that already rejected the “existing 
Indian family” exception were correct; where Congress intends there to be a 
categorical exception, “it provide[s] one expressly.”54 For example, 
Congress expressly provided for other ICWA exemptions such as divorce 
proceedings and placement resulting from juvenile delinquency.55 Contrary 
to state courts’ views that Congress was more concerned with Native 
American children living in Indian culture, such as on reservations, 
Congress was every bit as concerned with Native Americans whose 
families have “sporadic contact with the tribe.”56 As an illustration, the BIA 
regulation “applied the vast majority of ICWA provisions to off-reservation 
Indian children.”57 
Prior to the BIA’s regulation declaring the “existing Indian family” 
exception improper, there was debate over whether the U.S. Supreme Court 
partially endorsed the exception in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl in 2013.58 
Adoptive Couple has a notably similar fact-pattern to Baby Boy L.—the 
Kansas case that gave birth to the “existing Indian family” exception.59 
Both cases involved a non-Indian mother attempting to place her baby up 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. at 863.  
 50. Id.  
 51. ICWA Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 38778-01, 38801 (June 14, 2016) (to be codified 
at 25 C.F.R. pt. 23). 
 52. Id. at 38802. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id.  
 58. 570 U.S. 637 (2013); see Shawn L. Murphy, Comment, The Supreme Court’s 
Revitalization of the Dying “Existing Indian Family” Exception, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 629, 
645–47 (2014).  
 59. Murphy, supra note 58, at 644–45.  
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for adoption and a father, enrolled as a member in a federally recognized 
tribe, who sought to block the adoption.60  
Some scholars argue that the courts’ reasoning in both cases is 
synonymous and that the U.S. Supreme Court seemed to endorse the 
“existing Indian family” exception in Adoptive Couple.61 While the 
arguments that the Supreme Court partially adopted the “existing Indian 
family” exception are convincing, the BIA tackled this contentious debate 
head-on. The BIA states that “the Supreme Court did not adopt the . . . 
exception, even though some parties urged the Court to adopt it in the 
Adoptive Couple case.”62 Instead, the holding in Adoptive Couple applies to 
a very narrow set of facts where “a parent . . . abandoned the child prior to 
birth and never had legal or physical custody of the child.”63 
The “existing Indian family” exception is an example of courts’ 
disregard for ICWA. While the abrogation of the “existing Indian family” 
exception was a step in the right direction, courts still get ICWA wrong—
specifically, by narrowly construing the “reason to know” standard. Yes, 
the Supreme Court of Washington, in Z.J.G. adopted a broad interpretation 
of the “reason to know standard” under ICWA,64 but other states have 
recently applied narrower interpretations. 
C. Narrow Interpretations and Other Shortcomings of the “Reason to 
Know” Standard 
Children are afforded the protections of ICWA if a court has “reason to 
know that an Indian Child is involved . . . .”65 An Indian child is defined as 
“any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a 
member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian 
tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”66 When a 
court has “reason to know” there is an Indian child involved in a custody 
proceeding, it must provide legal notice to the tribe so the tribe has the 
opportunity to intervene and determine the status of the child.67 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 647–50.  
 62. ICWA Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 38778-01, 38802 (June 14, 2016) (codified at 25 
C.F.R. pt. 23). 
 63. Id. at 38815. 
 64. 471 P.3d 853, 865 (Wash. 2020). 
 65. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). 
 66. Id. § 1903(4).  
 67. Z.J.G., 471 P.3d at 865 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a)). 
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As exemplified in Z.J.G., the crux of a case may often be “whether there 
is a ‘reason to know’ that the child is . . . an Indian child” under ICWA.68 
Without notice of a Native American child’s status as “Indian,” a tribe may 
be deprived of the opportunity to intervene.69 Whether a court adopts a 
narrow or broad interpretation of the “reason to know” standard becomes 
the determinative factor in triggering ICWA.  
Some courts have taken a narrow approach in applying the “reason to 
know standard” under ICWA, such as in In re L.R.D.70 This case involved a 
custody proceeding that ensued after police arrived at a hotel to find two 
parents under the influence of drugs.71 The police found drug paraphernalia 
and observed that the minor children were malnourished.72 After the trial 
court granted permanent custody to a local agency, the father of the 
children appealed, contending that the trial court erred in granting 
permanent custody without invoking ICWA and providing notice to the 
child’s tribe.73 The trial court, however, did inquire as to the existence of 
any Native American ancestry the children may have in a pretrial hearing.74 
The mother stated that she knew her father was Native American but that 
she didn’t know if he was a registered member of a tribe.75 The mother 
herself was an unregistered member.76 The trial court determined that 
ICWA did not apply because the mother was not a member of a federally 
recognized tribe.77  
On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals examined whether the trial court 
had reason to know that the L.R.D. child was an “Indian child” within the 
meaning of ICWA.78 The court held that, in order for a child to receive 
heightened protection under ICWA, the party raising the issue “must do 
more than simply raise the possibility that a child has Native American 
ancestry.”79 The court took a textualist approach in applying the statute and 
determined that, the children were not children of a registered member of a 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Id. at 864–65 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a)). 
 69. Id. at 861. 
 70. 2019-Ohio-178, 128 N.E.3d 926, at ¶ 19 (Ct. App. 2019).  
 71. Id. ¶ 3. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. 
 74. Id. ¶ 22.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. ¶¶ 22–23. 
 77. See Id. ¶ 22. 
 78. Id. ¶¶ 18–20. 
 79. Id. ¶ 21. 
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tribe because only their grandfather was a registered member, and thus, 
ICWA protections were not warranted.80 
Another example of a narrow reading of the “reason to know” standard 
occurred in the Virginia Court of Appeals’ case of Geouge v. Traylor.81 In 
Geouge, a woman discovered she was pregnant after being convicted of 
various crimes.82 While serving her sentence, she gave birth to L.T.83 After 
her birth, L.T. bounced around between the Department of Social Services, 
her biological father, and her eventual adoptive parents.84 L.T.’s father then 
filed a petition to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court to 
accept his consent for adoption and transfer of custody and to accept the 
consent of the mother or to “otherwise address her parental rights.”85 
Subsequently, the mother filed a petition requesting L.T.’s transfer to the 
grandmother’s cousin and for visitation rights.86 The trial court denied the 
mother’s petition.87 The couple seeking to adopt L.T. filed a petition for 
custody of the child, to which L.T.’s mother replied with a motion to 
dismiss.88 The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court denied the 
mother’s motion to dismiss and granted custody to the couple seeking to 
adopt L.T.89 
Subsequently, L.T.’s mother filed a motion to stay the proceedings with 
the Virginia Circuit Court, claiming that L.T. had Native American 
ancestry, and thus ICWA should have applied.90 The court denied the 
mother’s stay and granted custody to the couple seeking to adopt L.T.91 
L.T.’s mother then filed an appeal with the Virginia Court of Appeals.92 
In determining whether the Circuit Court erred in denying the mother’s 
stay, the Virginia Court of Appeals had to decide whether the lower court 
had “reason to know” L.T. was an Indian Child under ICWA.93 Although 
the Virginia Court of Appeals acknowledged that L.T.’s mother was not 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. ¶ 23. 
 81. 808 S.E.2d 541 (Va. Ct. App. 2017). 
 82. Id. at 543. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 544. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 545, 548. 
 92. Id. at 549.  
 93. Id. at 551. 
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required to prove that L.T. was an Indian child, she did bear the burden of 
establishing ICWA’s application.94 However, the court held that L.T.’s 
mother did not meet this burden, that the Circuit Court did not have “reason 
to know,” and therefore the Circuit Court did not err in deeming ICWA 
inapplicable.95 The court reasoned that, although the mother claimed L.T. 
was of Cherokee descent, she could not in good faith claim that her 
daughter met the definition of an “Indian child” under ICWA.96 The court 
insinuated that a party raising ICWA must make more than a “bald 
assertion” that the act “might apply.”97 
More recently, California adopted a narrow interpretation of “reason to 
know” in In re M.W.98 The M.W. facts are similar to those in Geouge: 
during the child’s custody proceedings in M.W., the father said he had 
Native American ancestry and that his “grandparents ‘may have 
membership.’”99 After speaking with the father’s sister, the court ordered 
the Sacramento County Department of Child, Family, and Adult Services 
(“the Department”) to inquire further for purposes of ICWA.100 The 
Department eventually contacted the child’s grandfather who stated that the 
child may have Navajo and Apache ancestry.101 Other family members 
indicated potential Cherokee ancestry.102  
The Department identified and contacted twelve tribes.103 Four 
responded, stating that the child was not an Indian child under ICWA.104 
Thus, the juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights and 
concluded that ICWA did not apply.105 Subsequently, a social worker 
testified that six other tribes also confirmed the child was not an Indian 
child under ICWA.106 
The father appealed the orders of the juvenile court, claiming they did 
not comply with ICWA.107 In its analysis, the California Court of Appeals 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Id. at 550–51. 
 95. Id. at 553. 
 96. Id. at 552–53.  
 97. Id. at 553. 
 98. 263 Cal. Rptr. 3d 427 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020). 
 99. Id. at 430. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at 431. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 432. 
 107. Id. 
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was not convinced the juvenile court had “reason to know.”108 The court 
reasoned that the father only indicated that he “may have Indian ancestry,” 
and “there was at best a reason to believe” under California law, but not 
“reason to know” under ICWA.109 Moreover, the only person in the family 
with information regarding Native American ancestry was the paternal 
grandfather, but “the paternal family had not been involved with the 
reservation for generations.”110 The court further justified its holding with 
the fact that all but two of the tribes confirmed the child was not an “Indian 
child” under ICWA.111 With all relevant facts in mind, the California Court 
of Appeals found that the notice to the tribes was not required despite the 
fact that the child might have Native American ancestry.112 
In re J.W.E. presents yet another shortcoming of a narrow “reason to 
know” interpretation.113 Despite the fact the Oklahoma Court of Civil 
Appeals ultimately held there was “reason to know” in this case, the court 
adopted a more narrow interpretation.114 Here, the child became an enrolled 
member of a tribe in the middle of trial.115 The mother moved for a new 
trial because this enrollment invoked ICWA procedures, which were not 
followed by the trial court.116 The court held that ICWA applied starting 
from the date the child became eligible for enrollment or actually enrolled 
as a member of the tribe.117 Thus, the court erred in not granting a new trial 
when ICWA procedures were not followed.118  
The J.W.E. court clarified that its holding did not mean ICWA applied 
from the filing of the case in 2011; rather, ICWA was invoked starting at 
the time the child became eligible for enrollment.119 Under a broad 
interpretation of “reason to know” explored later in this Note, there would 
likely have been “reason to know” from the moment the court knew the 
child had tribal heritage and not just when the child became eligible for 
enrollment. 
                                                                                                                 
 108. Id. at 435 
 109. Id. at 434–35. 
 110. Id. at 435. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.  
 113. 2018 Ok Civ. App. 29, 419 P.3d 374 (Okla. Civ. App. 2018). 
 114. Id. ¶ 18, 419 P.3d at 379. 
 115. Id. ¶ 7, 419 P.3d at 376. 
 116. Id. ¶¶ 7–9, 419 P.3d at 376. 
 117. Id. ¶ 29, 419 P.3d at 381. 
 118. Id. ¶ 31, 419 P.3d at 381. 
 119. Id. ¶ 29, 419 P.3d at 381. 
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II. The Supreme Court of Washington’s Broad Interpretation 
in In re Dependency of Z.J.G. 
The issue of notice and “reason to know” under ICWA recently arose in 
Washington in the case of Z.J.G.120 With an assortment of applications of 
the “reason to know” standard under ICWA, this case presented an 
opportunity for Washington to clear the air. 
A. Facts of the Case 
Police removed Z.G. and M.G. from the care of their parents based on 
concerns of neglect and unsanitary living conditions.121 At this time, Z.G. 
was twenty-one months old and M.G. was two years old.122 After being 
entrusted to the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (the 
Department), the Department found that the state had “reason to know” that 
both children met the definition of “Indian child” under ICWA.123 This 
conclusion was based on the fact that the children’s “[m]other [had] Tlingit-
Haida heritage and [was] eligible for membership with Klawock 
Cooperative Association.”124 The Department then initiated contact with the 
tribes to inquire into the children’s status.125 
At the shelter care hearing, the trial court asked a social worker whether 
the children qualified under WICWA—Washington’s version of ICWA.126 
The social worker responded: “To my knowledge, not at this time.”
127
 The 
social worker contacted Alaskan tribes that informed him that the maternal 
grandmother was an enrolled member of the Tlingit-Haida Tribe but neither 
the mother nor the children were enrolled.128 The father of the children then 
testified that the mother was eligible for membership with the Tlingit-Haida 
Tribe and the Klawock Cooperative Association of American Indians.129 
The father stated that the children’s mother also had Cherokee heritage and 
that he also possessed some Native American ancestry.130 The mother 
                                                                                                                 
 120. 471 P.3d 853 (Wash. 2020). 
 121. Id. at 857. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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confirmed the father’s testimony and additionally stated that the children 
were eligible for membership with the same tribes.131 
The trial court then determined that, based on the testimony of both the 
social worker and the parents, ICWA did not apply.132 The trial court then 
removed the children from their parents without following ICWA 
procedures.133 The state’s court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial 
court and the Supreme Court of Washington took the case to review.134 
B. The Supreme Court of Washington’s Analysis 
The Supreme Court of Washington decided there is “reason to know” a 
child is an Indian child when someone at a proceeding claims the child has 
Native American ancestral ties.135 This is a much broader approach to the 
“reason to know” standard than the courts in L.R.D.,136 Geouge,137 M.W.,138 
and J.W.E.139 followed. The court adopted this broad interpretation of the 
“reason to know” standard based on (1) respect of the tribe’s exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine tribal membership, (2) canons of statutory 
interpretation, (3) statutory language and regulations, and (4) congressional 
intent.140 
The court referred to case law and BIA regulations to determine that a 
broad interpretation of the “reason to know” standard respects tribes’ 
exclusive jurisdiction in determining tribal membership.141 It explained that 
tribal affiliation is not merely based on ancestry or blood quantum.142 
Rather, the determination of tribal membership is one of political affiliation 
with the tribe.143 Because tribes hold the exclusive jurisdiction to decide 
whether a political affiliation exists, a broad interpretation best serves 
tribes’ exclusive jurisdiction.144 Further, because “[t]ribal membership is 
unique to each tribe,” leaving the determination to state agencies or parents 
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would be inappropriate, “would undermine tribes’ exclusive authority to 
determine membership and would undermine the protections of 
[ICWA].”145 Therefore, formal notice to tribes gives them the opportunity 
to make membership determinations within their exclusive jurisdiction.146 
The court also justified its holding using a canon of statutory 
construction—more specifically, a canon of statutory construction for 
statutes affecting tribes.147 It states that “statutes are to be construed 
liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to 
their benefit.”148 The court noted that a liberal construction favoring notice 
and the “reason to know” standard is in accordance with the above-
mentioned canon of construction.149 Thus, when there is any indication that 
the child has tribal heritage, the canon of construction favoring an Indian 
tribe’s interpretation of a statute requires a liberal interpretation of notice in 
favor of tribes.150 
In addition, the court found a liberal construction of the “reason to 
know” standard compelling based on numerous statutes and regulations.151 
First, it cited to federal regulations promoting “compliance with ICWA 
from the earliest stages of a child-welfare proceeding.”152 The court further 
cited to regulations noting that early ICWA compliance not only benefits 
children, families, and tribes but also the judicial system by reducing delays 
and duplication of proceedings.153 Second, the court addressed a list of 
factors provided by the BIA that indicate where there is a “reason to 
know.”154 The court criticized the court of appeals’ analysis claiming that 
there is only a reason to know if the court finds evidence that the child is a 
member of a tribe.155 The court concluded that the factors provided by the 
BIA did give it “reason to know.”156 Therefore, the court of appeals’ 
construction of the standard was too narrow.157 
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Furthermore, and arguably most importantly, the court held that the 
legislative intent of ICWA supports an expansive interpretation of the 
“reason to know” standard.158 The court alluded to the history of ICWA’s 
enactment, including the abusive removal of Native children from their 
families and tribes without respect for Native American culture.159 The 
court additionally relied on current BIA regulations such as those providing 
guidance in the event of known tribal heritage but uncertainty as to which 
specific tribe is implicated.160 In that case, the “notice of the child-custody 
proceeding must be sent to the appropriate Bureau of Indian Affairs 
Regional Director.”161 Thus, a broad interpretation of the “reason to know” 
standard best addresses the intent of ICWA.162 
Lastly, the court noted that other states have recently trended toward a 
more liberal interpretation of the “reason to know” standard.163 The court 
cited cases in California, North Carolina, and Colorado to support its 
argument.164 In all of the cited cases, the given court required formal notice 
despite lack of direct evidence of tribal membership.165 In most of the cases, 
there was merely an indication at some point that the child could potentially 
have tribal heritage.166  
In conclusion, the trial court had reason to know that the children were 
“Indian children” for purposes of ICWA because three different people 
indicated the children had tribal heritage.167 
III. The Argument for a Uniform Broad Interpretation 
of “Reason to Know” 
The Supreme Court of Washington’s broad interpretation of the “reason 
to know” standard is a step in the right direction for ICWA. For many, In re 
Dependency of Z.J.G. was a historic decision.168 Regardless, there still 
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exists a need for uniformity in the interpretation of the “reason to know” 
standard. The BIA acknowledges that disparate application of ICWA is 
manifestly contrary to the intent behind ICWA.169 Yet, the disparity in 
courts’ interpretation of the “reason to know” standard causes varying 
results in ICWA cases based on the state where the child lives.170 A simple 
solution for this variation is to adopt uniform regulations for the 
interpretation of the “reason to know” standard. The advantages of a 
uniform broad interpretation of “reason to know” can be broken down into 
four categories: (1) early intervention; (2) historical sensibility; (3) judicial 
efficiency; and (4) enhanced clarity. 
A. Early Intervention 
The broad interpretation of the “reason to know” standard adopted by the 
Supreme Court of Washington will prompt parties and courts to invoke 
ICWA earlier in cases.171 This early intervention will remedy some of the 
shortcomings of a narrow interpretation such as motions for new trials 
where ICWA procedures are not followed (as exemplified in In re 
J.W.E.).172 A more encompassing interpretation of “reason to know” sets a 
lower standard to trigger ICWA and thus reduces the risk that courts might 
fail to follow procedure required under the Act. As the Supreme Court of 
Washington noted in its opinion, the “reason to know” standard “ensures 
that the court applies the heightened ICWA . . . standards early on in any 
proceeding and ensures that tribes receive adequate notice of the proceeding 
in order to protect their children and the tribes’ sovereign interests.”173 
Further, BIA regulations state that “[e]arly compliance promotes the 
maintenance of Indian families, and the reunification of Indian children 
with their families whenever possible, and reduces the need for disruption 
in placements.”174 The lower threshold to trigger ICWA procedures adopted 
by the Supreme Court of Washington is an advantage for tribes and Native 
children alike because it will cause courts to comply with ICWA early in 
child custody proceedings.  
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B. Historical Sensibility  
Second, a broad interpretation of “reason to know” is justified in light of 
the history of widespread removal of Indian children from their tribal 
culture and the intent and purpose of ICWA.175 At the time ICWA was 
enacted, the disparity of children being removed from their homes between 
Native Americans and non-Native Americans was alarming.176 In response, 
Congress enacted ICWA to protect Native American children and their 
tribes by ensuring that Native American children were not removed from 
their unique cultures.177 Broadly interpreting the “reason to know” standard 
better serves that intent. When interpreted too narrowly, “reason to know,” 
looks more like an independent determination by the court regarding 
whether the child is an Indian child.178 A uniform and broad interpretation 
of the “reason to know” standard better satisfies the overall purpose of 
ICWA’s enactment: to reduce the number of Native American children 
removed from their culture.179 In addition, a broad interpretation respects 
tribes’ exclusive jurisdiction to determine membership.180 Simply following 
the notice procedures of ICWA poses little risk,181 and doing so will benefit 
Indian children. A broad interpretation of the “reason to know” standard” is 
thus appropriate considering the historical background of ICWA and the 
issue Congress sought to rectify through ICWA’s enactment. 
C. Judicial Efficiency 
Third, a uniform and broad interpretation prevents error in child custody 
proceedings and therefore promotes judicial efficiency. A more inclusive 
interpretation of the “reason to know” standard ensures increased 
compliance with ICWA by erring on the side of caution. In fact, doing so 
presents little risk compared to the costs of erroneously deciding not to 
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follow ICWA.182 Not only is the burden of a new trial or other additional 
proceedings borne by the courts, but the burden, more unfortunately, falls 
on the individuals, including children, involved in the proceeding.183 When 
ICWA procedures are erroneously disregarded, the individuals bear the 
brunt of the burden through the dissipation of their resources.184 Most 
importantly, ignoring ICWA can lead to instability in placements for the 
child involved.185 A broad interpretation of the “reason to know” standard 
would prevent unnecessary court proceedings. It would therefore foster a 
more efficient process for all parties involved.  
D. Enhanced Clarity 
Finally, a broad interpretation of the “reason to know” standard is 
simple. Broad interpretation allows courts to decide whether they must 
provide formal notice to the child’s tribe without need for much inquiry. 
This interpretation also excuses courts from wrestling with individual 
tribes’ membership requirements which “are unique to each tribe and vary 
across tribal nations.”186 In the case of In re Dependency of Z.J.G., the court 
determined that an indication of tribal heritage constitutes “reason to 
know.”187 Such a simple standard allows courts and state agencies to 
quickly make an ICWA determination. And courts would not have to 
consider senseless factors, such as the date of tribal membership in In re 
J.W.E.,188 in determining whether there is “reason to know” the child is an 
Indian child. The simplicity carries its way up to judicial review as well; if 
lower courts do not initiate ICWA procedures after someone indicated a 
child had tribal heritage, appellate courts would be required to remand the 
case without spending much time analyzing the appeal.  
These advantages are merely a few of the numerous potential advantages 
of a uniform and broad interpretation of the “reason to know” standard. 
Another benefit worth mentioning is that there would be uniformity 
amongst the states. That is, every child would be afforded the protections of 
ICWA if there was an objective and consistent standard. While the idea of a 
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uniform and broad interpretation is compelling, the more challenging aspect 
lies in implementing new regulations incorporating a broad “reason to 
know” standard.  
IV. Implementing a Broad Interpretation of 
the “Reason to Know” Standard 
In 2016, the BIA provided guidelines for implementing ICWA.189 In 
those guidelines, the BIA instructs state courts to ask whether the 
participants know or have “reason to know” that the child is an Indian 
child.190 The guidelines also explain the definition of an Indian child as 
“any unmarried person who is under age 18 and either: (1) a member or 
citizen of an Indian tribe; or (2) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe 
and is the biological child of a member/citizen of an Indian tribe.”191 Thus, 
the current language of the guidelines allows a reasonable construction of 
the statute to create a “reason to know” only if a court knows the child is 
eligible for membership.192 As it stands, the guidelines do not provide a 
clear understanding of when there is a “reason to know” a child is an Indian 
child. Therefore, the BIA should adopt clearer, broader, and uniform 
“reason to know” standards for states to follow.  
A broad, uniform approach to the “reason to know” standard is 
advantageous for all parties. Implementing the standard, however, presents 
its own challenges. Although the BIA currently provides a list of factors to 
determine when there is “reason to know,” the use of “Indian child” in the 
factors have led some courts to engage in a circular, narrow approach of 
determining a child’s eligibility for tribal membership.193 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court of Washington addressed this in its opinion:  
The Department argues, and the Court of Appeals found, that the 
combination of these provisions—the factors indicating a reason 
to know and the statutory Indian child definition—means that a 
court has “reason to know” only if there was evidence or 
testimony at the proceeding that the child or parent is a member 
of a tribe . . . However, this narrow interpretation commits the 
error addressed above: it assumes state agencies or participants 
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will know and properly interpret tribal membership and 
eligibility rules.194 
To remedy this circular reasoning, the BIA should consider changing the 
language of its current factors. For example, the first factor currently states 
a court has “reason to know” where “[a]ny participant in the proceeding, 
officer of the court involved in the proceeding, Indian Tribe, Indian 
organization, or agency informs the court that the child is an Indian 
child.”195 If the BIA considered amending this factor to exclude the phrase 
“is an Indian child”196 in favor of “has tribal heritage,” it would create a 
broad and uniform “reason to know” standard similar to the interpretation 
by the court in In re Dependency of Z.J.G.197 Simply put, the BIA will clear 
up any confusion by updating the language in its factors that give courts 
“reason to know.”  
Additionally, the BIA can implement a broad and uniform policy of 
“reason to know” by simply amending the language of the factors provided 
in the Code of Federal Regulations.198 Doing so would lead to earlier and 
more effective ICWA intervention, honor the historical significance of 
ICWA’s enactment, increase efficiency for the courts and parties involved, 
and create a simple, easy-to-follow standard. While Washington and other 
states have adopted regulations conducive to a broad interpretation of the 
“reason to know” standard, improved regulations in more jurisdictions will 
assure favorable outcomes and serve the purpose of ICWA.  
Another way the BIA can develop a uniformly broad interpretation of the 
“reason to know” standard is to explicitly instruct courts to liberally 
construe the current factors provided in Code of Federal Regulations. That 
is, the BIA can tell courts to utilize the canon of statutory construction used 
by the Supreme Court of Washington in In re Dependency of Z.J.G.199  
Maybe “reason to know” is entirely too narrow. Perhaps a lower standard 
should substitute the current “reason to know” standard such as a 
“reasonable possibility” standard. After all, erring in favor of notice is a 
relatively low burden in comparison to the excessive costs of not following 
ICWA procedures.200 
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There is a long, unfortunate history of state courts undermining ICWA. 
From the “existing Indian family” exception to independently, and 
erroneously, determining tribal eligibility, state courts consistently fail to 
carry out ICWA’s intent. The current language in the BIA guidelines might 
be a contributing factor to the widespread adoption of narrow 
interpretations of the “reason to know” standard by state courts.  
Some states, such as Washington, have adopted broader interpretations to 
honor ICWA’s purpose. While the adoption of broad interpretations by 
these states is a positive development, changes to the current BIA 
guidelines to be more inclusive will ensure uniform compliance and carry 
out the legislative intent behind ICWA. The BIA has several options—it 
can amend the current language, add regulations, or eliminate the entire 
“reason to know” standard in favor of a more comprehensive test. 
Regardless, action must be taken in order to remedy the injustice carried out 
by courts incorrectly applying ICWA . 
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